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Abstract
Background: A number of significant chemical incidents occur in the UK each year and may
require Emergency Departments (EDs) to receive and manage contaminated casualties. Previously
UK EDs have been found to be under-prepared for this, but since October 2005 acute hospital
Trusts have had a statutory responsibility to maintain decontamination capacity. We aimed to
evaluate the level of preparedness of Emergency Departments in North West England for managing
chemical incidents.
Methods: A face-to-face semi-structured interview was carried out with the Nurse Manager or a
nominated deputy in all 18 Emergency Departments in the Region.
Results: 16/18 departments had a written chemical incident plan but only 7 had the plan available
at interview. All had a designated decontamination area but only 11 felt that they were adequately
equipped. 12/18 had a current training programme for chemical incident management and 3 had no
staff trained in decontamination. 13/18 could contain contaminated water from casualty
decontamination and 6 could provide shelter for casualties before decontamination.
Conclusion:  We have identified major inconsistencies in the preparedness of North West
Emergency Departments for managing chemical incidents. Nationally recognized standards on
incident planning, facilities, equipment and procedures need to be agreed and implemented with
adequate resources. Issues of environmental safety and patient dignity and comfort should also be
addressed.
Background
Exposure to hazardous chemicals can occur as a result of
a wide range of events including through accidental
release, industrial accident and by act of terrorism.
Around 1300 chemical incidents occur in the UK each
year, most involving fewer than 10 casualties [1]. Most
published UK guidance on the management of major
chemical incidents assumes or dictates that casualties will
be decontaminated at the scene of the incident [2] and
then transported to hospital. This pattern of patient
behaviour was not substantiated by experience in Japan,
where 85% of patients following the Tokyo subway sarin
attacks in March 1995 self-transported to hospital [3], or
in the United States, where between 1995 and 2001 15
Emergency Department (ED) personnel were injured as a
result of contaminated casualties in 6 different incidents
with agents including hydrofluoric acid, acetone, hydro-
chloric acid and chlorine [4]. There are also case reports
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where contamination of an ED by a patient has resulted in
the department having to be closed for a period [5].
Serious inadequacies have been highlighted in the prepar-
edness of UK Emergency Departments for the manage-
ment of chemical incidents. In 2000, 76% of EDs did not
have satisfactory premises for decontamination and 66%
lacked protective equipment for staff [6], whilst 23% of
those departments with 20,000 or more new attendances
per year had no capacity to decontaminate patients or staff
[7]. It might have been hoped that the events of Septem-
ber 11th 2001 and the subsequent raising of awareness of
chemical threats might have improved the situation. This
has not however been substantiated by the National Audit
Office [8] or a more recent study which found that only
82% of UK EDs had trained staff in the use of Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE). The same study identified a
number of problems with the PPE currently in use, nota-
bly leaks around the foot area and problems with sizing
[9].
With the implementation of the Civil Contingencies Act
in October 2005, NHS Acute Trust Chief Executives
acquired statutory responsibility for the adequacy of their
facility's plans for dealing with major incidents, including
the management of chemically contaminated casualties.
The Department of Health guidance "Beyond a Major
Incident" states:
"It is likely that the current equipment, preparations and
general capability for decontamination of small numbers
of casualties at most hospitals would be put under severe
strain by the scale and circumstances of mass casualty inci-
dents with contamination. The hospital must address this
by developing a mass casualty plan, in close collaboration
with police and fire services for control of the site, mass
decontamination and to deal with self referrals. The spe-
cial arrangements necessary will include crowd manage-
ment and a triage/assessment facility as an adjunct to the
A&E Department to avoid cross contamination [10]."
We therefore aimed to assess the preparedness of hospi-
tals in our region for the management of a chemical inci-
dent.
Methods
A 34-item questionnaire was constructed by one of the
authors (JW) to address decontamination incident plan-
ning, staff training, estate facilities, equipment, protocols,
water supply for patient decontamination and issues of
dignity, privacy and comfort (see Additional file 1). Each
of the 18 EDs in the North West England region was con-
tacted and the questionnaire was administered in person
by JW at interviews with either the nurse manager or
another member of staff with expertise in decontamina-
tion, nominated by the nurse manager. The interviewee
was pre-informed of the topics to be covered in the inter-
view by fax. Any questions which could not be answered
by the interviewee were addressed by a telephone call to
the Estates Department of the hospital in question. Ano-
nymised data was entered into SPSS 10.1.4 (SPSS inc®) for
analysis.
Results
All 18 Emergency Departments in the region participated.
In 6 the nurse manager was interviewed personally,
whilst, in the remaining 12, another person was nomi-
nated (10 other senior nurses, 1 consultant, 1 emergency
planner).
Planning and training
16 of the 18 departments had a formal written incident
plan for the management of chemical incidents, but only
7 of these had it easily accessible at the time of interview.
12 respondents were confident in their ability to wash
down a patient, but only 5 were sure of the time required
for decontamination. 16 interviewees felt they knew
which agencies to contact in the event of a chemical inci-
dent, of which 9 had the appropriate telephone numbers
immediately to hand. Agencies which would be contacted
were:
• Emergency services (fire, police, ambulance): 18
• Environment Agency: 17
• Health Protection Agency (Chemical Hazards & Poi-
sons): 17
• Local authority: 14
• Water company: 14
Training relating to response to a chemical incident was
ongoing in 12 departments. Of the remaining 6, 3 could
not quantify the training levels of current staff, 2 relied on
managers and senior doctors being trained and 1 had
"some" senior staff trained. Of the 12 departments with
ongoing training, this was mixed theory and practice in 11
and practice assembly of the decontamination unit in 1.
Sessions were repeated more than twice a year in 3 depart-
ments, between once and twice a year in 3, less than once
a year in 2, and were considered to be a one-off in 4.
Facilities and equipment
All departments had a designated decontamination area.
In 17 this was outside and of these 16 used PLYSU® units
and 1 an Airshelta® unit. It was unknown in the depart-
ment with an indoor decontamination facility whether its
ventilation could be separated from that of the rest of theBMC Emergency Medicine 2007, 7:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-227X/7/20
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hospital. 11 interviewees felt that their departments had
adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for staff
involved in decontamination.
Water supply and disposal
All departments were using water from the hospital
mains, 17 directly to supply the showerhead and 1 to fill
buckets. All 17 using a showerhead confirmed that it had
no ability to reach contaminated water. 8 departments
had a double check valve fitted to the water supply to
ensure no backflow into the hospital mains was possible,
1 department knew that there was no safety valve and 9
were unsure of safety precautions. The water supply for
decontamination was run weekly in 5 departments, never
in 2 and at unknown intervals in the remaining 11.
7 departments used standard mains cold water for decon-
tamination, 5 because work to heat the water had yet to be
carried out and 2 for unknown reasons. 11 departments
used a hot/cold water mix of above 38°C, all for reasons
of patient comfort. Water temperature was thermostati-
cally controllable in only 3 of the 17 departments using
showers.
In 11 departments, contaminated water could only be
contained up to 500 litres (under 1 hours' worth of decon-
tamination). 4 departments could contain up to 1000
litres (between 1 and 2 hours' worth) of effluent and 3
could contain more. Once containment capacity had been
exceeded, 4 departments would allow overflow into
drains, 3 could bypass to further storage tanks, 7 would
stop decontaminating and 4 were unclear of their further
actions. 2 departments had formal contracts with private
waste disposal companies for the disposal of contami-
nated water, 11 were relying on the fire service and 5
planned to seek advice from the Health Protection Agency
or Environment Agency. In the event of disposal into the
drain, 2 departments could easily differentiate between
surface and foul water drains, 1 had a combined drain sys-
tem, 1 only drained to an underground tank (from an
indoor decontamination facility) and the remaining 14
could not identify surface and foul water disposal facilities
but felt that the hospital Estates Department would be
able to do so. When discharging into mains drainage, 5
departments planned to add fluorescein dye to the con-
taminated water to aid identification at downstream sew-
age processing facilities.
Patient privacy, dignity and comfort
6 departments provided a sheltered area for patients to
remove contaminated clothing before decontamination;
this was the ambulance bay canopy in 3, in a specific sep-
arate unit in 1 and in the decontamination unit itself in 2.
Temporary clothing consisted of Rotecno®  purpose-
bought clothing in 2 departments, paper clothes in 9, hos-
pital gowns and blankets in 4, hospital gowns only in 2
and hospital blankets only in 1.
9 departments felt they could adequately maintain patient
dignity during decontamination, 7 using hospital screens,
1 a specific unit and 1 the decontamination unit itself. 1
department planned to separate men and women using
hospital screens.
Discussion
Planning and training
It is alarming that 2 departments lacked a written plan for
chemical incidents and a further 9 could not access theirs
at the time of interview. This suggests that the majority of
departments would not have a plan available in the event
of an incident, which is likely to result in delays or even
failures in contacting appropriate personnel from within
and outside the hospital and in substandard handling of
patients, possibly with unnecessary risks to staff. A recent
Delphi study into chemical incident management sug-
gested training to a national standard for all ED medical
and nursing staff [11]. It is apparent that this is not the
current standard, with two-fifths of departments having
no current training programme and one-fifth being una-
ble to identify trained staff in the department.
Chemical incidents require the use of specialist and com-
plex equipment (both PPE and decontamination tents)
and, given our findings, it is unlikely that these could be
efficiently used. It is of equal concern that only half of
departments had telephone contact numbers for the other
agencies likely to be involved in a chemical incident
response immediately to hand. Although this might not
immediately compromise patient care, delay in contacting
agencies such as the Health Protection Agency or the Envi-
ronment Agency could impact adversely and unnecessar-
ily on the safety of the local area and the environment in
general.
Facilities and equipment
Although it is reassuring to find that all departments sur-
veyed have a designated area for decontamination, several
interviewees expressed concerns over the speed with
which external shelters could be erected; it is recom-
mended that units should be erected and ready for use
within 15 minutes [11]. Several departments expected it
to take around 45 minutes to have a functioning unit.
Although all decontamination units had a 'dirty' entrance
and 'clean' exit demarcated, one third of the departments
had yet to consider how to prevent casualties cross-con-
taminating themselves and each other. It is particularly
worrying that one-fifth of departments felt they lacked the
equipment necessary for safe decontamination and a fur-BMC Emergency Medicine 2007, 7:20 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-227X/7/20
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ther fifth had not examined the equipment closely
enough to identify missing or problematic equipment.
Water supply and disposal
It is encouraging that 17 of 18 departments are using a
shower facility to decontaminate rather than the bucket
system which compromises the ability of staff to rinse off
contaminant and detergent and which provides less dilu-
tion of the contaminant. The use of mains cold water in
two-fifths of departments, however, compromises patient
compliance and comfort and increases the risk of hypo-
thermia, especially in vulnerable groups such as the eld-
erly and young children. Although there is little published
evidence on the optimal water temperature for decontam-
ination (to balance increased efficiency of cleaning
against peripheral vasodilation and increased transcuta-
neous absorption of contaminant at higher tempera-
tures), most experts contacted in the course of this survey
suggested a temperature midway between cold and body
temperature. No department surveyed was currently using
this, and only 3 had thermostatically controlled showers
which would make it possible.
Over half of the departments surveyed could not confirm
the presence of any backflow protection on their water
source from the hospital mains, risking leak of any con-
taminants into the main hospital supply (and in contra-
vention of the Water Fittings Regulations 2000 – personal
communication, Water Regulations Advisory Scheme). It
is also apparent that patients and staff may be put at risk
from Legionella during decontamination; three-quarters
of departments were unable to confirm the regular run-
ning of decontamination water points [12].
The appropriate management of contaminated effluent
water is still under debate and it is still argued in some
quarters that dilution of contaminant with large quanti-
ties of water renders it acceptable for discharge into sewer-
age systems [6]. Specific protocols for the management of
contaminated water at hospital sites are not available, but
Water UK (representing the utility companies) states as a
general principle that "contaminants and contaminated
materials should be contained either at the scene or in a
holding tank until they have been properly identified".
Their protocol for medium scale to mass decontamina-
tion in essence comprises a hierarchy of containment
(with the expectation that the Fire Service will have 1
hour's containment capacity), discharge to foul sewer and
finally discharge to surface water drains [13]. Although
three-quarters of departments would attempt to contain
contaminated water, three-fifths had capacity of less than
one hour. Were this to be exceeded and contaminated
water directed into the sewerage system, 14 departments
could not independently identify foul and surface water
drains, and only one-quarter would add fluorescein dye to
the effluent to facilitate its identification in the water sys-
tem for downstream handling. We would advocate
increased contact between hospital emergency planners
and utility providers to mitigate this.
Patient privacy, dignity and comfort
Our findings suggest that little consideration has been
given to issues of patient compliance, dignity, comfort
and even safety. Two thirds of departments surveyed
could provide no shelter for patients disrobing before
decontamination, even though the process of decontami-
nating each patient may take up to 10 minutes and casu-
alties would be expected to remain outside the Emergency
Department until their turn. Even after decontamination,
two-fifths of departments relied on hospital gowns to
clothe their patients, thereby failing to offer full body pro-
tection and compromising modesty. Anecdotal reports
made during this survey suggest that some patients may
refuse treatment rather than compromise their modesty;
"one man left the scene because he refused to take his
clothes off outside...a crowd was forming around the bar-
riers...".
It is clear that a training gap exists in the management of
contaminated casualties in our region. We suggest that
this reflects a lack of training capacity both in terms of
time and finance, given the multiple constraints affecting
most Emergency Departments (notably the 4-hour target,
and other mandatory training to fulfill Health and Safety
requirements). Questions of who and how many to train,
and to what level, remain unclear, and it has been our
experience that decontamination management is often
sacrificed to competing, more immediately-measurable
priorities.
Conclusion
We have identified major inconsistencies in preparedness
for chemical incidents amongst Emergency Departments
in North West England, with deficiencies in planning,
facilities, equipment and training. Clear national guide-
lines are still required to address these problems and until
standards are set and enforced it is likely that these incon-
sistencies will remain.
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